New Citizenships? New technologies, rights and discourses
Zoetanya Sujon


1. Introduction

Emerging technological initiatives, literatures and global practices are juxtaposing new technologies with citizenship, frequently suggesting that nations, governments and geographically bounded cultures no longer solely determine who can become citizens; indeed, new technologies are often causally linked with the emergence of ‘new’ political subjectivities, processes and territories. The central role of new technologies within citizenship discourses is often justified and positioned through emerging civic practices based on three primary areas of influence: enabling more democratic and expanded membership systems; introducing new publics and social territories; and establishing new de-territorialised citizen rights and obligations.

This chapter focuses on the latter, particularly new citizen rights (rather than obligations), as represented in a small sample of discourses about the technological mediation of citizenship, namely cyber citizenship, netizenship and technological citizenship. First, I establish some of the ways citizenship has been defined, and analyze the discursive construction and positioning of what is new about ‘new’ technologically mediated citizenship rights. The emergence of such rights is important as, according to Turner (2001: 204-205), ‘new patterns of citizenship’ are illustrated by a ‘new regime of rights’. Second, I concentrate on the inherent tensions, commonalities, overlaps and shifts in the discursive organization of citizenship in new citizenship discourses.

It is not the aim of this chapter to establish the legitimacy, truth or potential of ‘new citizenships’. Nor is it my aim to analyze the many ways technological determinism is reiterated through citizenship discourses. My aim in this chapter is not to establish a comprehensive overview of the ‘new rights regime’ and the many different ways we can interrogate the social and political significance of ‘new’ rights related to communication technologies. Instead, this is a necessarily incomplete chapter and as a result, there are many omissions. My aim is to develop an indicative sense of the discursive construction of new citizens. I argue that new citizenship discourses re-articulate rights, highlight important tensions around universality and suggest that there is a discursive shift in the organization of citizenship from institutional bodies to collective associations akin to technologically oriented trade unions.

2. Defining citizenship and the role of rights

Before turning to the issue of what, if anything, comprises ‘new citizenships’; we must first establish what comprises ‘citizenship’. Citizenship is a contested term and citizenship scholars, advocates and practitioners come from multiple perspectives and often-diverging fields of practice. As so many have acknowledged defining citizenship is neither an easy or straightforward task.

Nonetheless, citizenship has been defined as a kind of membership ‘status’ (Marshall, 1992 [1950]: 18; c.f. Faulks, 2000) or as the political means used to ‘identify subjects’ and establish the ‘conditions for full membership’ (Jenson and Papillon, 1999: 2). Citizenship is articulated as a way of thinking about national membership, social belonging and the regulation and negotiation of such belongings through legal and cultural frameworks established through citizen rights and obligations (Miller, 1994: 12). Gershon Shafir expands this argument when he suggests that citizenship
functions not only as a kind of national framework but also as a kind of ‘sociological perspective’ or ‘strategic concept’ (Shafir, 1998: 3; c.f. Citizenship Studies, 2003).

Articulating citizenship as a status, as a framework and as a strategic concept complicates understandings of what is new about ‘new citizenships’. Although his work has been heavily critiqued, it is here that T. H. Marshall’s three dimensions of citizenship (civil, political and social) outline a valuable framework for both operationalising citizenship and situating citizenship discourses within a broader rights based view (see Table 1).

Table 1: T. H. Marshall's Dimensions of Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Obligations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil: ‘Courts of Justice’ (circa 1832)</td>
<td>‘the rights for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice’ (1992: 8, 17) ‘the right to work’ (1992: 10)</td>
<td>Responsibility to other civilians: e.g. to ensure labour equity through fair wages and unionisation (1992: 41-43).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political: ‘Parliament’ and ‘local Government’ (circa 1918)</td>
<td>‘the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body’ (1992: 8, 17)</td>
<td>Obligation to work: in order to contribute to the economy and support the government through taxes (1992: 45-48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social: ‘Educational system[s] and social services’ (circa 20th Century)</td>
<td>‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (1992: 8, 17)</td>
<td>Public duty: to ensure the betterment of the individual and the polis or common good through education (1992: 37, 43)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

As Shafir argues, Marshall’s civil, political and social realms go significantly beyond thinking of citizenship only as a status or form of membership (Shafir, 1998: 13). Although based on historical analysis of rights and class in England, Marshall’s account is also a discursive account, one that has been important in generating a great deal of further work on citizenship, equality and the development of citizenship. There are two important discursive characteristics in Marshall’s account. First, citizen rights are allocated ‘from above’ through institutional bodies; and second, although there are tensions between rights ‘to liberty’ and ‘to participate in the exercise of political power’, for the most part, subjects are positioned as passive citizens (Turner, 1990: 199-201).

Related to the positioning of political subjects, Saskia Sassen argues that analyzing citizens or ‘the rights-bearing subject’ provides insight into the foundational ways in which people can and do become part of national or ‘de-nationalised’ social and political systems of membership (Sassen, 2006: 278). For Sassen, the forces involved in establishing new avenues for the ‘destabilizing of national bundlings’ are connected to the emergence of ‘new political subjects’ (Sassen, 2006: 279).

Daiva Stasiulis notes that Marshall ‘saw the defining features of twentieth century citizenship as consisting of the expansion of social citizenship rights’ (2002: 365). Stasiulis’ observation is important, because in the form of legal systems, rights formally outline the relationship between citizen and state, allocating a framework for regulating political and cultural members as well as
establishing avenues of action for citizens to exert and negotiate power. For example, Michael Schudson describes feminist and civil rights movements as ‘widening the web of citizenship’ by extending civic participation into the courtroom, federal government and the ‘nationalisation of public policy’ (Schudson, 1998: 264, 250, 258). As such, the contestation and negotiation of rights provide political and civil avenues for people to be political actors in ways and in places that had been previously institutionally closed or denied.

Thus, rights are central for citizenship in at least two ways. First and building upon Sassen, rights are also formative because they establish a frame for political subjectivities. In both cases, rights and obligations establish formal and informal mechanisms for citizens to negotiate social and political territories, and as such, the emergence of new rights are often correlated with new kinds of political actors and subjectivities. Second, according to Stasiulis and Schudson’s link between rights and ‘widening the web of citizenship’, rights are important because they are major contributors to the extension of realms of participation and potential spheres of action.

3. Mapping ‘new citizenships’? Technologically mediated discourses of citizenship and ‘new’ rights

The links between citizenship and new technologies are broad and depending on how you define the interaction between the two, can include discussions centring around civil society, media literacies, social movements, communities, public spheres, local and transnational spheres, government among many, many others. Citizenship, and technologically mediated discourses of citizenship, can refer to everything and nothing; marking a major tension between the democratization of citizenship processes and the hollowing out of meaningful citizenship through the empty proliferation of nominal citizenship categories.

In order to counter this, I ask you to think of technologically mediated discourses of citizenship as a broad categorisation of a wide array of concepts, practices, initiatives and texts which overtly connect new technologies with citizenship. I offer a strategic overview of these discourses, and focus on only three including cyber, net and technological citizenship. I have chosen these discourses because they, like many other technologically mediated citizenship discourses, propose emerging citizen rights in relation to new technologies in a manifesto like fashion. Characteristically, the majority of these discourses hold ICTs as at least partially responsible for creating new kinds of political, social, economic and cultural forms of belonging, transforming existing dimensions of citizenship and/or significantly reconfigure citizen practices and phenomena. The number of these different discourses suggests that there has been a proliferation of citizen frames, resulting in the pluralisation of citizenship or the emergence of ‘new citizenships’.

After a closer look, I conclude that there are distinct shifts in the organization of citizenship according to the re-articulation of rights to access, participation, education and freedom of (collective) association. Even within this brief overview of new citizenships, there are numerous contradictions, conflicts and ellipses; yet synthesizing the overlaps and interstices, complementary or otherwise, across and between these discourses suggest that ‘new citizenships’ represent a shift in the organization of citizenship power from institutions to almost guild like, technologically based citizen collectives

3.1. New Citizenship: Cyber citizenship, netizenship and technological citizenship

There are often tensions in the literatures and arguments linking technologies and citizenship because although new technologies are centrally featured as either a singular or bundled set of sources of and for change, many discourses often do not explain the role of new technologies in the transformation of citizenship; rather new technologies are positioned as defining the public sphere
through the organization of information, education (particularly new literacies) and participation in a normatively universal public good.

3.1.1. Cyber citizenship: The doubling of access

Vincent Mosco, who implements the notion of ‘cyber citizenship’ in a much more sophisticated fashion than others (e.g. Odzer, 1997), flags the importance of creating an inclusive ‘culture of technology’ that adheres to the values and conditions of technological ‘have-nots’ as well as ‘haves’. Mosco cites education as the principle vehicle for establishing ‘this new form of [cyber] citizenship’ (Mosco, 2000: 377; Turkle, 1995). Mosco proposes that we need to utilise cyber citizenship in order to combat the concretisation of the digital divide. For example, Mosco states:

Citizenship in the new electronic age means treating cyberspace as a public space or ‘new commons’. Here, all people have rights of access and participation, reasonable expectations of privacy and security, and, along with these rights, civic responsibilities of active involvement and mutual respect for fellow cyber-citizens. Genuine education for an information society starts by teaching these principles and uses the Net as one among the many means to implement them (Mosco, 2000: 383).

In this sense, Mosco is claiming that new technologies have to be viewed as a central point of everyday praxis because they enable the betterment of the common good and as such, it is important to protect and establish ‘cyberspace’ as a ground that can improve the individual and the polis or community to which that individual belongs (c.f. Ogden, 1998: 67). LITA (Library and Information Technology Association) emphasize ‘cyber rights’, claiming that cyber citizenship entails the incorporation of ICTs into civil society, because ICTs have become important gatekeepers between civil society and its citizens. Thus, in order to ensure citizens have cyber rights, LITA calls for the institutionalisation of a ‘universal opportunity of access’ that should be employed through the implementation of ICTs in order to prioritise ‘equity of access’ (Reynolds, 1992: 27-28, 31). In this sense, LITA builds upon issues of access by adding both ‘equity’ and incorporation of ICTs into the discussion.

The meaning of ‘access’ here is doubled. Access is not only about the rights to have access to the tools mediating information, but is also about ‘access’ to the ways knowledge is embedded within technological systems through education. Both of these forms are connected to the right to equal access to public spheres, and access in and through these means are positioned as establishing socio-economic and cultural equality. In this sense, new technologies are conflated with civic life equality and the development and enrichment of both individual and public goods. This resonates with Marshall’s social dimension and the ways an educated citizenry ensures the ‘betterment of the individual’, not only for the individual’s benefit, but also for enriching the public. Notably, and also like Marshall, the emphasis for cyber citizenship is on the institutionalization of technological access and education.

3.1.2 Netizenship: Participation, collectives and freedom of association

The Net is not a Service, it is a Right. It is only valuable when it is collective and universal. Volunteer efforts protects the intellectual and technological common-wealth that is being created. DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE POWER OF THE NET and NETIZEN (emphasis in the original, Hauben and Hauben, 1996: np).

New technologies in these discourses are presented as fundamental tools or instruments for establishing and negotiating collectivities, and through the use of such tools, new political and social subjectivities and associations are constituted (Pal, 1998; Odzer, 1999; Ogden, 1998). The
Haubens, attributed with inventing the term in the early 90s, argue that the term ‘netizen’ captures the unique emergence of ‘citizens of the Net’, citizens who carry invigorated rights and obligations and are ‘people who care about Usenet and the bigger Net and work towards building the cooperative and collective nature which benefits the larger world’ ([1995] 1996: np).

For the Haubens, the internet enabled an empowering platform for the freedom of expression and the democratisation of participation (for those that had the technical access, knowledge and time to participate in the netizen community). In this sense, netizenship also promotes the doubling of access rights discussed above.

Netizenship has also been strongly associated with the Korean ‘citizen journalism’ site OhmyNews (Hauben, 2007b; Hauben, 2007a; Seok, 2005). The director of OhmyNews, Oh Yeon Ho, challenges some of the premises of early netizenship when he raises interactivity, shifts in power and the importance of political and cultural contexts in realizing technologically mediated capacities to push positive political change (Oh, 2004: n.p.). For Oh, the issue is not about unique and inherent technological capacities, or rights; instead, it is about people achieving their own capacities to enable positive social change. In this way, the associational, membership expanding potential of the internet crumbles without the motivation, preparedness and will of citizens.

Finally, Alex Argote explicitly outlines a unique characteristic of netizens, that is, the ‘great mission and duty to lift humanity to even greater heights…. [to] thunder across the digital void….to break….down the barriers to total change and prosperity for all’ (Argote, 2007: n.p.). Although comparatively understated in the Haubens’ earlier accounts, the almost missionary zeal for netizens to take responsibility of and for ‘enlightening’ and connecting the ‘unconnected’ is also present (Hauben and Hauben, 1996: n.p.). This has two connotations. First and in terms of rights, this suggests a formalisation of citizen to citizen associations and a shift of responsibility to citizens, as individuals to be part of collectives to and for other citizens. Second, ‘the great mission’ highlights a disjuncture between the democratisation of participation with and between engaged subjects and a kind of colonial logic where the digitally ‘unenlightened’ need to be taught how to participate in the ‘technological commonwealth’.

Like cyber citizenship, netizenship re-prioritises rights of access and participation while positioning the individual, collectives and the freedom of association to and within a ‘technological commonwealth’. Netizen advocates call for recognition and legitimisation of a technologically bounded public and communities, merging civil, political and social rights through new technologies.

3.1.3. Technological citizenship: Education, informing and learning

[Technological Citizenship is] a set of binding, equal rights and obligations that are intended to reconcile technology’s unlimited potentials for human benefit and ennoblement with its unlimited potentials for human injury, tyrannization and degradation. Such status, rights and obligations are thus intended to reconcile democracy for lay subjects of technology’s impacts with the right of innovators to innovate…. Technological citizenship affirms human freedom, autonomy, dignity, and assimilation [versus alienation] of people with fellow people and with their built world (Frankenfeld, 1992: 462).

Philip Frankenfeld (1992: 470) defines technological citizenship, specifically in relation to risk communications and as a general means for instituting protective measures against dangerous technologies (e.g. the atom bomb, genetically modified foods and pharmaceuticals like thalidomide). Frankenfeld is arguing that science and technology are pervasive forces capable of transforming everyday life, and without a system for regulating these forces, their capacities can invite threatening and negative consequences. These points suggest a diffusion of the national or
institutional locus of citizenship power across a number of corporate, agricultural and civil sources, culminating in technologically bounded collectivities.

As a result of this pervasiveness and the technological capacity to inflict individual and cultural damage, humans must formalise new spheres of citizenship to account for and protect against such hazards. Frankenfeld presents a complex and compelling argument. In addition to the doubling of access rights, technological citizenship, calls for the formalization of collective associations, not only by those in science and technology fields but also by and to ‘lay subjects’. Frankenfeld repeatedly emphasizes the reciprocity between informing and learning (1992: 472, 462). Informing and learning are not only an extension of the ‘right to education’ but also introduce specific rights and responsibilities to intervene in the ‘unavoidable’ advance of technologies into the social world. In this way, the importance of balancing both the negative and positive sides of technological capacities is also being formalised as the responsibility of individuals.8

Thus, discourses of technological citizenship propose that new sciences and technologies not only reconfigure and require technologically mediated rights to access, education, equality, information, participation, privacy and security; but also emphasize the reorganization of citizenship processes from civil, political and social institutions towards expert and ‘lay’ technological enclaves.

4. ‘New rights’? Rearticulating rights, shifting dimensions and technological collectivities

Technological determinism plays, to varying degrees, an ideological role in all of these perspectives; yet despite this, new citizenship discourses point to shifts in the locus of citizenship power and re-articulations of existing rights (for critiques on technological determinism see for example, Mackenzie and Wajeman, 1999; Winner, 1999 [1980]; Silverstone, 1994).

In all of the new citizenship discourses discussed here, there is a reconfiguration and expansion of rights to access, participation, freedom of collective associations, and finally, of education. So the question remains, what is interesting or new about new technologically mediated ‘regime of rights’? One of the challenges in addressing this question and analysing technologically mediated discourses of citizenship is the ellipsis between implied and direct rights and characteristics of new citizenships. Although not every right listed below has been addressed in this chapter, I offer a summary of ‘new’ rights emerging from new citizenship discourses below (see Table 2).
Table 2: Technologically mediated rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right to</th>
<th>Cyber</th>
<th>Netizenship</th>
<th>Technological</th>
<th>Marshall’s Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access [Technical]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Implied in the social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access [knowledge]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Social (in the form of education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of association</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Political, social and civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom from commercial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manipulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of innovators to innovate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy and Security</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Social Security [privacy excluded]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Technological commonwealth’</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the multiple tensions, contradictions and overlaps within and between these ‘new’ citizenship discourses, there are a few notable commonalities. First, these discourses point to the creation of a fourth technologically bounded dimension and/or emergence of important public resources that not only reintegrates existing rights, but also establishes technological prerequisites for actualising citizenship. New citizenships position a ‘technological commonwealth’ as ‘fundamental’ to the exercise of polity, identity and the actualisation of humanity; and as such, the re-articulation of individual rights in terms of technologies provides the means to ‘widen the web of citizenship’. The darker side of this point is that new technologies also provide a narrowing of citizenship by organizing rights through access to technologies.

However, these reconfigurations of rights and shifting prioritisations do not illustrate the emergence of new political subjects or legitimate new citizenships. The blurring of civil, political and social rights and dimensions does not have to be about the technological transformation of citizenship (Marshall, 1992 [1950]: 8). The counter explanation here is that new technologies shift prevailing social standards. In this sense, new technologies amplify basic standards of living but do not necessarily qualitatively change public, political or social frameworks.

The right to equality is present in all the technologically mediated discourses discussed here, and this has two implications. First, this right emphasises that things are not equal. Many of the rights and freedoms included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have yet to be guaranteed for citizens from advanced democracies as well as emerging ones (1948; c.f. Benhabib, 2004; van Dijk, 2005; Isin, 2002). Second, there is a tension between elite and ordinary citizens and who is able to actualise their rights, new or otherwise, and who cannot. This tension is highlighted in terms of rights and obligations to knowledge in technological citizenship; but is also prevalent in cyber
citizenship and netizenship. For example, Mosco bases the importance of cyber citizenship, in line with traditions of ‘negative rights’, as a protective force from the ‘concretisation of the digital divide’. For Mosco, socio-economic inequities mean that people have differential levels of engagement with new technologies and as such, with citizenship. In ‘new citizenships’ discourses, guaranteeing an equal capacity for citizenship means reprioritising rights and obligations in terms of shifting material (and technological) standards.

Related to the digital divide, both netizenship and technological citizenship implicitly refer to establishing new ‘technological’ or ‘internet’ associations, positions which support Pippa Norris’ work, among others, on the role of new technologies in ‘connecting the connected’ (Norris, 2001: 65).

The emergence of the political dimension of citizenship did not involve the introduction of new political practices; rather, the political dimension came to be ‘not in the creation of new rights … but in the granting of old rights to new sections of the population’ (1992: 12; c.f. Turner, 2001b). Thus, the transfer (rather than creation) of organisational processes; to different dimensions lead to the creation of new citizenship elements. Such a shift is noteworthy. For example, Marshall claims that citizen rights began to hold more power around the same time that trade unions introduced collective bargaining. Marshall argues that trade unions could ‘exercise vital civil rights collectively on behalf of their members without formal collective responsibility’ (1992 [1950]: 26). Marshall maintains that collective bargaining did not extend civil rights. In contrast, ‘it represented the transfer of an important process from the political to the civil sphere of citizenship. … Trade unionism has, therefore, created a secondary system of industrial citizenship’ (1992 [1950]: 26).

Perhaps one of the unique elements of new citizenships relate to the shift from an ‘industrial’ model of citizenship, where the rights to work, welfare and education are pre-eminent, to a ‘technological’ model of citizenship. In this model, the responsibility for the development of public resources is individualised and the regulation of the ‘public’ is shifting more towards both technologically mediated networks of individuals and the private sector. This marks a tension from rights being developed from ‘below’ as implied through the repeated prioritization of technologically enabled communalities over national or institutionally organized citizenship rights; and the diffusion of citizenship power and control based on the responsibilization of individuals and pluralization of guild like collectivities or technologically based associations.

In conclusion, although carrying ‘new’ technologically specific names, new citizenships do not replace pre-existing forms of citizenship. Rather, technologically mediated citizenship discourses incorporate and expand existing citizenship dimensions and models rearticulating rights in highly normative ways.

However there is a tension between the legitimacy of expansions to citizenship dimensions and the hollowing out of citizenship by neologisms, shallow conceptions of citizenship as loose associations and an over prioritisation of the technological. I argue, following Marshall, that it is valuable to consider ‘new citizens’ and their cyber, net and technological communities as kinds of new trade unions. And following the shift from the political to the civil sphere and the beginning of industrial citizenship, we have what discourses of ‘new citizenships’ would likely frame as tertiary form of ‘technological citizenship’. I would argue, instead, that we have a pluralisation of citizenship and a diffusion of the locus of citizenship power (e.g. through the blurring of dimensions) and the responsibilisation of individuals – to other individuals and to the ‘technological commonwealth’. The threat is a narrowing of citizenship based on divisions between technologically elite and ordinary citizens. The promise, of course, is that new citizenships formalize technological collectivities who successfully champion and re-articulate existing rights and freedoms to protect and develop increasingly technologically bounded spheres of civil, political and social action.
References


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1 For example, Marshall has rightly been attacked not only for the absence of women in his citizenship schema (Pateman, 1994 [1989]; Lister, 1994 [1990], 2003), but also for his anglocentrism and sole focus on Britain (Manning, 1993; Mann, 1996). He is perhaps most often critiqued on his evolutionary conception of citizenship – because the dimensions do not tend to occur in a linear fashion in other cultural contexts, and because they tend to appear in a substantially different order than Marshall had suggested (e.g. Turner, 1993, 1990; Manning, 1993; Shafir, 1998). Brian Turner, one of Marshall’s keenest critics, argues that the dimensions are lacking because they are primarily applicable to the welfare state and rapidly lose relevance outside of this kind of British national framework (Turner, 1990, 2001b).

 And finally, Turner claims that the Marshallian framework for citizenship is being eroded primarily because of globalisation and the decreasing influence of the nation-state (2001: 204-205).

2 Such extensions of and to the meaning of citizenship is necessary because including a ‘general vision of humanity’ has real implications not only on women, migrants, refugees, non-citizens and many excluded others, but also on ‘full’ citizens. Advocates of this position rightly argue that it is not enough to limit definitions of citizenship to the ‘formal relationship between an individual and the state’ (Yuval-Davis and Werbner, 1999: 4). Broadening the scope of citizenship also allows for a more holistic relationship ‘inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging’ (Yuval-Davis and Werbner, 1999: 3-4).

3 Sassen describes digitisation as an ‘assemblage’ of forces that are ‘deeply caught up with other dynamics’ and cannot be interpreted as either technologically deterministic or as merely consolidating existing social and political patterns (Sassen, 2006: 329).

4 Some of these broad claims include ‘cyber citizenship’ (Mosco, 2000; Kranich, 1992; Harrison, 1992; Gray, 2002; Ogden, 1994, 1998); ‘netizenship’ (Hauben and Hauben, 1996; Pal, 1998); ‘technological citizenship’ (Frankenfeld, 1992; Barry, 2001); ‘digital citizens’ (Lieshout, 2001; Rommes, van Oost and Oudshoorn, 1999); ‘online citizens’ (Harcourt, 1999; Riems and Lovink, 2002); ‘e-citizenship’ (Coleman, 2005, 2004, 2001, Coleman and Norman, 2000; Alexander and Pal, 1998; Gutstein, 1999; Larsen and Rainie, 2002; Monnoyer-Smith and Merlin, 2002; Dahlberg, 2001; Tsaliki, 2002); and ‘cyborg citizens’ (Gray, 2002; Gray, Mentor and Figueroa-Sarriera, 1995; Haraway, 1993).

5 A large part of LITA’s (1991) published essays revolves around citizenship rights to government protection from information abuses, invasions to privacy and the exemption of the private sector to the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) (Reynolds, 1992: 5, 8-22). For further information on privacy in relation to library and information technologies, please see Kapor, 1992: 65; on library patron records (Harrison, 1992: 121ff); and on legislation (King, 1992; Kling, 1999). Additionally, there are excellent critical inquiries into the changing nature of individual privacy in relation to the increasing surveillance capacity of governments and corporations (Mulgan, 1991; Bogard, 1996; and Gandy, 2002b, 2002a, Gandy, 1996).

6 Specifically, Oh argues that the success of *OhmyNews* is because of the distinctive political and cultural history of Korea. For example, Oh explains that Korea has ‘active netizens’ because Koreans have long struggled against military dictatorships silencing citizens (e.g. the Korean War in 1950 and The Kwangju Massacre in 1980), and this long history has contributed to a citizenry keen for alternative news sources and an end to the repression of information (Oh, 2004).

7 Oh historicises *OhmyNews*’s slogan, ‘every citizen is a reporter’ when he refers to times when news and information were passed on through face to face interaction rather than through media technologies (Oh, 2004: n.p.).

8 In contrast to Frankenfeld’s view, Andrew Barry argues that although these kinds of technological rights and obligations are central for ‘public knowledge’ they are too big a burden for most citizens to bear (Barry, 2001: 128). Barry also argues that technological citizenship is not new, rather it is historically rooted in cybernetics and is not only about developing particular complexes of technological knowledges, but also about the mediation of those expertise complexes, through science and technologies to the public.